This paper develops a model incorporating costly disinvestment and estimates the associated commitment premium required to invest in telecommunications. Results indicate that the irreversibility premium raises the opportunity cost of capital by 70 percent. This implies an average annual hurdle rate of return of 14 percent over the period 1986-2002. Irreversibility creates a distinction between observed and adjusted TFP growth. Observed growth, which omits the premium, annually averaged 2.8 percent from 1986 to 2002. This rate exceeded the (premium) adjusted TFP growth by 0.7 percentage points, therefore the average annual observed productivity growth overestimated the corrected rate by 33 percent.
Introduction
Investment in network industries such as telecommunications typically involves industryspecific capital so that investment reversibility is virtually impossible. Irreversible investment implies that a firm must incur substantial costs as it attempts to disinvest, and accordingly, capital cannot be shed like many other inputs. If network investments were reversible, a firm could readily disinvest when market conditions become unfavorable, thereby avoiding the financial consequences of these adverse conditions. However, because network investments are generally not fungible (in other words, they have limited alternative uses) a firm operating in a particular network industry commits to production in that industry. This commitment is costly. The reason is that a firm's ability to evolve through business conditions is relatively more constrained compared to firms undertaking fungible investment, while otherwise facing identical conditions. Therefore, as a consequence of the inability to disinvest, the "hurdle" rate of return on capital must exceed the opportunity cost pertaining to circumstances when disinvestment is viable. The first purpose of this paper is to develop a model of production and investment that incorporates costly disinvestment. The model is subsequently applied to telecommunications in order to estimate the magnitude of the commitment premium in that industry. In telecommunications, copper and fiber optic cables are typical examples of network infrastructure where reversing investment is prohibitively costly. Estimates of a non-zero premium provide evidence of the costs associated with irreversible investment. Firms in the telecommunications industry referred to as incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) operate under an "obligation to serve" constraint, which requires capital to be on hand in order to stand ready to serve customers of basic landline telephone services.
1 This obligation represents an additional cost of investment in the context of irreversibility. If investment is reversible, ILECs could simply disinvest when basic landline telephone demand falls and reinvest when demand rises. An example of this behavior is found in the airline industry where aircraft are added or subtracted as required -indeed this is why planes are often referred to as "capital on wheels". But with irreversible investment, once capital is added to provide anticipated required capacity, it cannot be cost-effectively resold if the additional demand does not materialize.
2 Practically though, how likely is it for basic landline demand to fall and subsequently facility utilization decreases? After all, even if customers migrate to non-incumbent carriers who lease facilities from ILECs, these facilities still remain utilized as non-incumbents provide services to their own customers. But not all customers just migrate to other carriers; they migrate to alternative services from basic landline services. Wireless services, cable-based telephony and Internet-based services are substitutes for basic wireline services. Thus, as demands for these substitutes grow, all other things constant, competition in telecommunications markets reduces the basic landline customer base served by any one specific ILEC, as well as the customer base for all ILECs combined.
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A further complication is the problem of uncertain returns to investment. 4 Future market conditions, by their very nature, are uncertain and so network infrastructure investment will necessarily yield uncertain returns over its useful life. Under both conditions, namely irreversibility and uncertainty, there is an option value to waiting rather than investing. Intuitively, when a firm makes an irreversible investment, it gives up its option to wait to see how uncertainty is resolved.
5 If business conditions turn unfavorable, the firm is unable to disinvest if such events occur and would have to bear the financial consequences of the unfavorable conditions. It could not sell the capital and recover the undepreciated original value of its investment expenditure. 6 Thus, the uncertain future 1 These carriers are presently Verizon, AT&T and Quest. Also, long distance services and ancillary services, such as call-waiting and caller-id, are not subject to the constraint. 2 Although incumbents have an obligation to serve, investment incentives remain important because this obligation only applies to basic landline service. Carriers still have discretion over their investment decisions. Further, it has also been argued that regulatory regimes requiring the leasing of incumbents' facilities add an additional burden or constraint regarding investment decisions (see Kahn 2004 , Hausman 2003 and Tardiff 2002) . 3 To extent that existing facilities can be used for non-basic landline telephone services, such as DSL internet services, the costs associated with the obligation to serve are mitigated as basic landline demand falls. 4 As previously noted, even without uncertainty, returns to irreversible investment require a premium. 5 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide a theoretical development of option values and investment. 6 Economides (2002) has argued that returns to investment in telecommunications are quite stable. This however, is an empirical question that we address below in section 4 when alternative expectation processes are considered. Nevertheless, as noted above, even absent future uncertainty irreversibility adds to the costs of investment.
market value of network infrastructure requires a firm to form expectations regarding future prices of network facilities in order to formulate its investment plan. This paper incorporates uncertainty as future telecommunications capital acquisition prices are assumed to be random variables. Consistent with rational expectations, the parameters of the stochastic process are jointly estimated with the commitment premium associated with irreversible investment. Moreover, jointly estimating the expectations and commitment parameters improves the econometric efficiency of the estimates, as well as capturing the interrelationship between uncertainty and irreversibility. An important indicator of dynamic performance is the efficiency by which inputs are transformed into outputs. This measure is referred to as the rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth. TFP growth is calculated typically as the difference between a weighted average of output quantity growth rates (with revenue shares as weights) and a weighted average of input quantity growth rates (with cost shares as weights). In the context of irreversible investment, cost shares must include a possible commitment premium required to compensate firms for undertaking such investment. Since this commitment premium raises the opportunity cost of capital, it will affect the cost shares of the various inputs used in the production process, and accordingly, affect both input quantity growth and subsequent TFP growth rates. Productivity growth estimates for telecommunications generally exclude the costs of disinvestment. Therefore, "observed" TFP growth actually mismeasures the "correct or adjusted" rate, defined to include the appropriate measure of the opportunity cost of capital. The third purpose of this paper is to calculate both adjusted and observed TFP growth rates for telecommunication carriers and show how the two rates differ over time. An increase in the opportunity cost of capital due to the fact that investment is irreversible raises the capital cost share weight relative to the other input cost shares, and if capital is growing relatively faster (respectively slower) than the other factors of production, then observed input growth will understate (respectively overstate) the corrected rate of input growth. As a consequence observed, productivity growth will overstate (respectively understate) the appropriately adjusted rate of TFP growth. This paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 develops the model of investment which admits the possibility of costly disinvestment. This section shows that at the margin, these costs raise the capital input price (in other words the user cost of capital) relative to the case of reversible investment. Section 3 shows the calculation and decomposition of TFP growth. Both observed and adjusted TFP growth rates are considered in order to establish how the irreversibility premium affects the difference in productivity growth rates. Next, section 4 contains the empirical implementation and discussion of the findings. Results are presented on investment irreversibility margins, and differences in the rates of observed and adjusted productivity growth. Since the marginal cost of disinvestment affects the opportunity cost of capital, this section also provides a calculation of the hurdle rate of return to capital required to account for the costs of investment irreversibility. The last section of the paper provides a summary and conclusion.
Production and industry-specific investment
This section develops a model of production and investment when investment is irreversible or in other words, it is costly for the firm to disinvest. To begin, consider a transformation function written as:
where y t is an m dimensional vector of output quantities in period t , v t is an n dimensional vector of input quantities in period t , and t also represents the exogenous disembodied technology index.
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where x it is the addition to the i th input quantity in period t , and 0 1 i δ ≤ ≤ is the i th input depreciation rate. Since the depreciation rates for nondurable input quantities are defined as 1
Input accumulation typified by facility investment in network industries is often viewed to be irreversible. For some types of investment, the physical characteristics associated with capital utilization make recouping expenditures through resale not financially viable. For example, in telecommunications, the majority of the cost of underground cable is the cost of burying the cable and not the cable itself, and so removing the cable for resale would be prohibitively expensive. For other types of investment (for example, switching equipment) that presumably could be "uninstalled" and resold, the problem is that the equipment is industry-specific and so its resale value is tied to the industrial business cycle. Thus, when conditions turn unfavorable and a firm attempts to disinvest, there are no buyers as concomitantly all firms want to sell such capital. This renders investment de facto irreversible.
Irreversible investment implies the cost of disinvestment must exceed the expected proceeds from the sale of network facilities. Further, when it is costly to reduce capital holdings, as a firm builds up infrastructure capital it becomes "harder" to reverse the increase. In other words, the capital cost per unit of capital exceeds the market price of the asset and this cost rises with the size of network facilities. The cost of irreversibility can be formalized by the function ( ) The transformation function has the usual properties as described for example in Mas Collel, Whinston and Green (1995) . 8 The costs of irreversibility depend on the level of the capital stock. This differs from adjustment costs, which depend on the change in the capital stock. The reason for this difference is that if a firm decides not to invest in a particular period then adjustment costs are zero, but the costs of irreversibility do not disappear. As long as there are positive levels of network infrastructure there are costs to disinvesting. See Caballero (1999) for a survey on investment models.
Input demands are determined from minimizing the expected present value of acquisition and hiring costs. The uncertain future market value of network capital requires a firm to form expectations regarding these future prices in order to formulate its production and investment decisions. For example, in telecommunications, expectations involve the future prices of infrastructure capital such as switches, and copper cable. ρ + is the discount rate from period t to period 1 t + . The expression in (3) is minimized subject to equation sets (1), and (2). The Lagrangian for the problem is: 
where  ts is the Lagrangian multiplier in period t s + . Differentiating (4) with respect to v its , the first order condition for the i th input in period t s + is: 
9 It is possible to assume that the cost of disinvesting for any one type of capital depends on all types. This formulation is not introduced because in the empirical implementation, there is one capital stock. In addition, the irreversibility cost function could be specified as
Practically though, the marginal cost of disinvesting undepreciated facilities does not differ from the marginal cost associated with facility additions. Thus, it is assumed that
10 Although companies enter into equipment contracts with suppliers, these contracts have specified termination dates. (7), the value of the marginal product for the i th input equals its associated (expected) user cost, and with costly disinvestment, these marginal products exceed levels when investment is reversible. Next, having established how commitment premia affect the cost minimizing conditions at each point in time, the following section proceeds to identify the dynamic implications applicable to the measurement of productivity growth.
Costly disinvestment margins and TFP growth
The user cost derivation permits a recasting of the cost minimizing problem defined by (3) into the following equivalent form:
subject to the transformation function given by (1), for periods 0,..., t = ∞ . The problem in (8) relates to minimizing the production cost and leads to the first order conditions denoted by (7). From the equivalency of cost minimizing problems it is possible to define a cost function, which is denoted as: ). , ,.., , ,., (
This function depends on user costs, therefore on the margins associated with costly disinvestment, expected acquisition and hiring prices, output quantities and the index of disembodied technology.
To calculate TFP growth, begin with the general cost function given by (9). Assuming that the cost function can be approximated by a function, with time-invariant second and higher order parameters, the cost difference between periods s and t , defined as t
will consist only of first order terms (see Denny and Fuss, 1983; and Bernstein, Mamuneas and Pashardes, 2004) . Thus:
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is the output quantity growth rate and
is the adjusted input quantity growth rate, where p j is the j th output price, t R = 
. The cost shares are defined in terms of revenue because without loss of generality, it is possible to define an artificial input such that this 1 n + st input's price is ( )
Expression (11) shows that adjusted productivity growth represents technological change, where t ν ξ ) is the input-based rate of technological change in period t . The difficulty calculating adjusted TFP growth is the unobservability of the marginal disinvestment cost and as a consequence, adjusted TFP growth is unobservable. Thus, measures of productivity growth typically use observed cost shares to compute the input growth rate. These observed cost shares by their very nature must exclude the unobserved marginal costs of disinvesting, so "observed" productivity growth is defined as 
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Collecting terms in (12) and recall that , 
Further using (11) yields:
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where the second term on the right side of (14) is the observed profit margin. Measures of observed TFP growth relying on growth accounting methods, as opposed to econometric methods based on the estimates of production or cost functions, necessarily assume total revenue equals total (observed) cost.
11 To be consistent with growth accounting methods, introduce an 1 n + input such that the price of this input is total revenue minus observed cost or R t − c t , and its quantity is unity. Label this observed TFP growth inclusive of the accounting convention ( , ) o n TFPG s t so that
is the new observed input growth rate such that the i th cost share is defined as / it it it t s w v R = . With this convention (14) becomes:
Notice for the 1 
expense is computed by subtracting from total operating expenses the sum of labor compensation and depreciation and amortization expense. The intermediate input price index is taken to be the gross domestic product price index. The capital input is the accumulation of constant dollar annual investment plus the depreciated value of the previous year's capital stock. The acquisition price of capital before income taxes is defined as (1 ) /(1 ), 
where denotes the growth rate. In addition, future values of the capital acquisition price are uncertain and this random variable is assumed to follow a first order autoregressive process of the following form
where K φ , and K θ are parameters, the error e Kt is identically and independently distributed over time, and since expectations are rational, the expected value of Kt e is zero. Equations (17) and (18)+ = ) and autoregressive expectations for the capital acquisition price, and also provides Instrumental Variable (IV) estimates. The set of instruments consists of a constant, the twice lagged values of the input and output growth rates, the twice lagged value of the acquisition price of capital and the lagged values of the cost shares. The estimates for each of these three cases are also reported for constant and time varying rates of technological change. First from the standard error of the regression (SER) statistic, the results show that in each case the time varying rate of technological change outperforms the constant rate version. Second, although the parameter estimates are quite similar across models with time varying rate of technological change, the autoregressive expectations model is preferred to the other two. Indeed, testing the null hypothesis that expectations are static, in other words 0 (from the preferred model, which is the fourth column of estimation results). This finding implies that the associated commitment premium increases the user cost of capital by 70%, and as shown in table 2 annually averages to be 0.270. Since the margin between irreversible and reversible investment is a constant (as 1.7)
the user costs inclusive of the premium are readily converted to those without the premium by dividing the former by 1.7).
It is also possible to restate the commitment premium in terms of the cost of capital or equivalently the hurdle rate of return. Recall from (7) that . Therefore, omitting the commitment premium arising from irreversible investment underestimates the appropriate rate of return on capital. Second, with static expectations the average hurdle rate is estimated to be 0.129
This rate is 8.5 percent below the rate based on rational price expectations. But differences in average hurdle rates obfuscate an important outcome. As table 2 shows, the sample standard deviation of ρ * under static expectations is much higher than the standard deviation associated with rational expectations. This implies considerable sample instability with static expectations, and indeed for many years, hurdle rate estimates derived by mistakenly assuming static expectations are substantially less than the rates obtained from the rational expectations model. There is little empirical research to compare these findings. However, a paper by Pindyck (2005) using different methods and framework concludes that the telecommunications hurdle rate with irreversible investment is between 14.2 and 17.5 percent. This result is very similar to the estimates obtained in this paper. Table 3 reports the TFP growth rates and their decomposition. First, the generally positive rate of technological change contributes to productivity growth and over the period 1986-2002 the average annual rate of technological change was about 1.7 percent. Second, the observed TFP growth rate normalized such that total revenue equals total observed cost ( TFPG n o ) is generally positive and varies over the sample period. The average annual rate over the years from 1986 to 2002 was 2.8 percent. The preceding concept of productivity growth uses growth accounting methods as do many earlier studies of telecommunications' productivity. For example, Bernstein and Zarkadas (2004) found that over the period 1986-2001 productivity growth averaged either 2.7 percent or 2.9 percent depending on the disaggregation of intrastate outputs. The results in this paper are comparable and provide growth rates for the most current time period.
For the first time, this paper introduces estimates of the premium due to irreversible investment into the measurement of TFP growth. Since the commitment premium exceeds unity and with growing capital, this premium reduces adjusted productivity growth relative to the observed rate (that is, from equation (17), ( )
). Therefore, observed TFP growth overestimates adjusted productivity growth. Table 3 shows this result as observed productivity growth, TFPG o , consistently exceeds the appropriately adjusted rate, TFPG a . Indeed, on average, over the sample period observed, productivity growth annually overestimates adjusted growth by 0.7 percentage points per year. This bias is relatively large and represents a 33 percent productivity overvaluation when the costs of irreversible investment are incorrectly omitted from the analysis.
Summary and conclusion
A major purpose of this paper was to develop a model incorporating costly disinvestment in order to estimate the premium on the opportunity cost of capital in telecommunications where investment is often perceived as irreversible. Irreversible investment, for example in telecommunications copper and fibre optic cables, implies that a firm must incur substantial costs as it attempts to dispose of its capital stocks. As a consequence, firms commit to production. This is a costly commitment whereby the inability to disinvest raises the hurdle rate of return on capital above the opportunity cost associated with reversible investment. The findings in this paper indicate that telecommunications investment is indeed irreversible, and the opportunity cost of capital is 70 percent greater than would be the case under reversible investment. In terms of the hurdle rate of return on capital, costly disinvestment leads to an average annual rate of 14 percent, which is two and a half times the assumed return under reversible investment. Because of the commitment premium, this paper distinguishes between observed and adjusted TFP growth rates. The observed rate, which is the rate typically calculated in productivity studies, omits the premium. The premium raises the opportunity cost of capital and thereby affects the input cost shares used to compute input quantity growth. As a consequence, the revised input growth leads to the calculation of adjusted TFP growth rates. This paper finds calculates the average annual rate of observed productivity growth over the years from 1986 to 2002 to be 2.8 percent. On average, this rate overestimates adjusted growth by 0.7 percentage points per year. Indeed, this bias is quite large, representing an annual 33 percent productivity overvaluation when the significant costs of irreversible investment are inappropriately excluded.
There are a number of avenues for future research. Probably the most important direction is to translate the capital commitment premium into marginal costs of production for the various telecommunication services. With these marginal costs, it would then be possible to discern the proper basis to set regulated telecommunications prices, notably wholesale prices for access to the telecommunications network. If telecommunication carriers provided a single service, or if they produced multiple services in a fixed proportion, or priced these services according to a common markup (or markups in a fixed proportion to each other), the translation from commitment premium to marginal cost would be relatively straightforward. However, in the context of multiple services and distinct marginal costs, the translation from input premium to marginal costs of production requires knowledge of the multiple-product cost function. Estimation of this function in the context of costly reversible investment is the next step in our research program. Next multiply and divide the first and third terms of (A4) 
is the adjusted input quantity growth rate, such that the i th cost share is defined as / profit maximization or any specific pricing rule for that matter. It just signifies for the j th output, a number  jt ≥ 0 can always be found, which in general differs across outputs and across time periods and equates price to marginal cost. Multiplying the above expression by y jt and summing over j provides:
where the left side is the total revenue and the right hand side is the total cost multiplied by the sum of the product of output margins and output elasticities of cost. Thus, total cost is proportional to total revenue such that the proportionality factor is
18 18 The focus of the paper is not on output price-cost margins. Clearly, there is a relationship between the commitment premium for the user cost of capital and price-cost margins. In a single output context, the relationship is relatively straightforward but does require knowledge of the degree of returns to scale. This is readily seen from the right side of the previous expression. If there is a single output, or a common markup then: 
where a refers to the output elasticities defined with respect to the cost C . ( , ) a n TFPG s t is the adjusted TFP growth inclusive of the accounting convention so that ( )
( / )
